What are the extra-communicative restrictions one may experience as they think in a language in which they are not fully competent? When we think of the role of language in thought, the first line of inquiry that comes to mind is what is called linguistic determinism - the view that the syntactic or semantic structure of a language shapes what can be thought in these languages. But there is another sense in which language shapes thought that needs to be distinguished from the linguistic determinism debate. That is the way in which one’s personal linguistic resources afford certain thoughts in certain languages depending on the expertise one has in that language. Some recent work in feminist philosophy has explored this aspect of language, although not strictly as ‘linguistic’ resources but rather as ‘hermeneutical’ resources, which involves both linguistic and epistemic resources. As it is argued, when it comes to epistemic action, for example, the availability of certain concepts and linguistic items in the agent’s repertoire facilitate or inhibit thinking certain thoughts. I show that once we break from the monolinguistic assumptions about linguistic mental life, we begin to better understand what it is to navigate the world as a multilingual with varying degrees of linguistic competence. Drawing from recent debates on inner speech in cognitive science and philosophy of mind, I identify potential epistemic harms that linguistic agents experience as they think in a language with which they are not at ease. I argue that what I call cognitive noise, an unproductive effort generated by restricted articulation, takes away from an agent's attentional resources and thereby prevents them from achieving certain epistemic goods that are otherwise available through inner speech.